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The Criminal Courtroom:
Is it Child Proof?
Hon. BarbaraGilleran-Johnson"&
Timothy R. Evans*

I. INTRODUCTION

Consider the following hypothetical: While a divorce was pending
between Mr. and Mrs. X, Mrs. X retained custody of their three-yearold daughter. After weekend visitation with Mr. X, the child returned
home and told Mrs. X that Mr. X had hurt her "pee pee." Mrs. X took
the child to an emergency room, where the examining physician
determined that slight redness and slight swelling occurred in the
vaginal area. The physician could not emphatically state, however,
that sexual abuse caused the redness and swelling. Subsequently, prosecutors brought charges against Mr. X in criminal court, and the
juvenile court held a hearing to consider an action based on the best
interests of the child.
The juvenile court found the child, then three-and-one-half years
old, competent to testify and determined that the father assaulted the
child.' The criminal court, however, found the child, then four years
* Associate Judge, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Lake County, Waukegan,
Illinois, 1987; B.A., DePaul University, 1974; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1978. Judge Gilleran-Johnson worked as an Assistant Attorney General and as an
Assistant State's Attorney, specializing in juvenile law and crimes against minors. She
helped establish the first Child Protection Team in Lake County and was appointed to
the Governor's Citizen's Committee for Abused Children. The Illinois Supreme Court
appointed Judge Gilleran-Johnson on three occasions to the Illinois Judicial Conference
concerning juvenile law, where she held the positions of chairperson and vicechairperson. Judge Gilleran-Johnson also teaches classes in the areas of Criminal
Justice and Juvenile Law.
* * Staff Attorney, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Lake County, Waukegan,
Illinois, 1994; B.S., Illinois State University, 1984; J.D., with honors, John Marshall
Law School, 1994. Mr. Evans has a background in law enforcement, has taught in the
areas of Criminal Law and Search and Seizure, and is admitted to practice law in both
Illinois and Florida.
1. Although the scope of this Essay is limited to alternative means of testifying for
child witnesses, a cursory discussion of the procedural requirements in child welfare
proceedings is warranted. Notwithstanding the finding of responsibility by the
hypothetical juvenile court, federal law still requires that the juvenile court make
"reasonable efforts" to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of a dependent,
neglected, or abused child from the home, and to reunify the family, if possible, when a
lower court has removed the child. 42 U.S.C. § 671(15) (1988). Moreover, when the
case involves Native American children, the court must find that "active efforts have
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old, incompetent to testify and dismissed the matter. Subsequent to
the juvenile proceeding, the divorce court granted Mr. X supervised
visitation, but after the criminal charges were dismissed, it amended its
order to provide for unsupervised visitation.2 Believing that her role
as a parent required her to protect her daughter, Mrs. X sought shelter
underground when the divorce court refused to modify the unsupervised visitation order.3 No one has heard from or seen Mrs. X and her
daughter since Mrs. X allegedly changed her name, her social security
number, and her daughter's name.
This hypothetical case exemplifies the problems which result in
today's courts from the application of differing standards to determine
the competency of child witnesses. While the trend is to protect and
nurture children,4 the criminal courts must still weigh the defendant's
rights against the tenderness of a child witness.' If the criminal court
in the above hypothetical had presumed the child to be competent, and
had allowed her to testify in chambers via closed-circuit television, the
outcome of the case may have been dramatically different.
When a minor is required to testify, judges, prosecutors, and attorneys have always faced the difficult task of weighing the interests of
justice against the best interests of the child. The myriad of statutes
that pertain to children as witnesses, as victims, or as perpetrators,
compounds the difficulty of this task.6 Thus, while courts often deal
been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent
the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful." Indian
Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988). For a discussion of the "reasonable
efforts" standards in several different states, see DEBRA RATrERMAN ET AL., REASONABLE
EFFORTS TO PREVENT FOSTER PLACEMENT: A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION app. C (2d ed.
1987).
2. This result is consistent with the constitutional right to family integrity that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized as a parent's right to raise children free of
state intervention, unless a compelling reason regarding the child's safety or welfare
justifies intervention. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see also Developments in the Law: The Constitution and
the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of "Neglected" Children: A Searchfor Realistic Standards,27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
3. States are required to provide procedural safeguards for parents when visitation
arrangements are to be changed. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(c) (Supp. V 1993).
4. See infra notes 52-90 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
6. In Illinois, these statutes include the Children and Family Services Act, ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 20, §§ 505/1 to 505/41 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); the Abused and
Neglected Child Reporting Act, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 325, §§ 5/1 to 5/11.7 (West
1993 & Supp. 1995); the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705,
§§ 405/1-1 to 405/7-1 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); the Illinois Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, §§ 5/100-1 to 5/126-1 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995); the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. COMP. STAT.
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with the same parties and child witnesses in both civil and criminal
proceedings, courts must apply different statutes which result in contrasting decisions. These contrasting results should sound an alarm
for legislative action, especially as the number of child abuse7 and
neglect cases continues to rise.
From 1985 to 1990, reports of child abuse increased by thirty-one
percent nationally.8 In Illinois, the number of child abuse and neglect
cases reported each year in urban counties nearly doubled between
1983 and 1992. 9 In rural counties, the number of reported cases
increased by seventy-one percent.'0 In 1995 alone, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services projects that there will be
45,000 cases concerning abused or victimized children."
This Essay first traces Illinois's role as a pioneer and advocate for
children's rights.' 2 It then discusses the standards that different courts
apply in determining whether a child is competent to testify. 3 Next,
this Essay outlines recent constitutional challenges to child shield
statutes, including the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v.
Fitzpatrick.4 The Essay then analyzes Illinois's new child shield law,
which the Illinois General Assembly passed in response to Fitzpatrick.5 Finally, this Essay challenges the General Assembly to
ANN. ch. 750, §§ 5/101 to 5/802 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); the Adoption Act, ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 50/0.01 to 50/24 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); and the
Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 60/101 to
60/401 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
7. "Child abuse" is defined as "[any form of cruelty to a child's physical, moral or
mental well-being. Also used to describe form of sexual attack which may or may not
amount to rape... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (6th ed. 1990).
8.

SUBCOMMITIEE

ON CHILD WELFARE, ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

PRELIMINARY 1993 LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (1993).
9.

ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, OVERVIEW OF JUVENILE CRIME

AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM'S RESPONSE IN ILLINOIS 82 (October 1994) [hereinafter

OVERVIEW]. Verified cases of abuse increased by 60% during that same period. Id. Of the
total number of abuse cases reported to the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services in 1992, credible evidence supported 5,346 of those claims. ILLINOIS DEP'T OF
CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT STATISTICS:

ANNUAL REPORT-

FISCAL YEAR 1992 19 (1993) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. The total number of cases
reported in Illinois nearly tripled between 1982 and 1992 from 111,736 to 322,748
reports. Id. at 7. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES 214 (1994), for a summary of the increasing number of reported cases across the
nation.
10. OVERVIEW, supra note 9, 96-97 & fig. 52.
11.

ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9.

12.
13.
14.
15.

See
See
See
See

infra part II.
infra part III.
infra part IV.
infra part V.
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create1 6 a unified statute to encompass all laws pertaining to child welfare.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Illinois has historically pioneered the cause of children and the law.
The first juvenile court in the country was established in Chicago in
1899.' 7 Dr. William Healy created the first Child Guidance Clinic in
1909.18 By 1925, only two states had not yet joined Illinois in enacting juvenile justice legislation. 9 The federal government did not
enact juvenile justice legislation until the 1938 Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.20
In more recent times, the Illinois General Assembly, in 1987, revised the Juvenile Court Act to expand the child welfare laws in
existence. 2' Furthermore, the Loyola University Chicago School of
Law established the first ChildLaw Center, CIVITAS, to train future
attorneys who will specialize in representing children.22 Additionally,
in 1991, the Illinois General Assembly, although not the first to
establish a statute to protect child-victims, enacted the Illinois Child
Shield Act of 1991 (the "Child Shield Act").
16. See infra part VI.
17. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 1.1, at 1-1 (2d ed. 1980); ROBERT M.
REGOLI & JOHN D. HEwrrr, DELINQUENCY INSocIETY 381 (1991).
18. SUBCOMMITrEE ON CHILD WELFARE, supra note 8, at 9.
19. VICTOR L. STREW, JUVENILE JUSTICE INAMERICA 6 (1978).
20. Pub. L. No. 666, 52 Stat. 764 (1938) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5037
(1988)). For a short overview of the origins of the juvenile justice system, see SOL
RUBIN, LAW OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 1-8 (1976).
2 1. Juvenile Court Act of 1987, Pub. Act No. 85-601, 1987 111. Laws 2578 (codified
as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705, §§ 405/1-1 to 405/7-1 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995)).
22. The ChildLaw Center was established in the Spring of 1993 at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. Originating in Latin, "Civitas" is defined as: "In the Roman
law, any body of people living under the same laws; a state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
247 (6th ed. 1990).
For a greater discussion of Loyola's ChildLaw Center, see Diane C. Geraghty, The Role
of Legal Education in the Emerging Specialty of PediatricLaw, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 131
(1995).
23. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 106B-1 (West 1992), amended by Act of Dec.
14, 1994, Pub. Act No. 88-674, 1994 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2664 (West) (repealing
§ 5/106B-1 and replacing it with § 5/106B-5). For the full text of the current version of
the statute, see infra note 89.
The Child Shield Act was actually the General Assembly's second attempt to protect
child-victim witnesses. In 1987, the General Assembly passed its first child shield law,
which created a hearsay exception allowing videotaped testimony. ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 725, §§ 5/106A-1 to 5/106A-5 (1992), repealed by Act of Sept. 9, 1991, Pub.
Act No. 87-345, § 2, 1991 I11.Laws 1893, 1894. In People v. Bastien, 541 N.E.2d 670,
676 (IlL. 1989), the Illinois Supreme Court found a portion of the law unconstitutional
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COMPETENCY OF CHILD WITNESSES

A court must find all witnesses, whether adults or children,
competent in order to allow them to testify in court.24 To find a
witness competent, the court must determine that the witness has: (1)
a minimum capacity to observe, recollect, and recount the incident to
which the witness will testify;" (2) the understanding of the
importance to tell the truth; 26 and (3) personal knowledge of the events
about which the witness will testify.27 While criminal courts do not
distinguish between adult and child witnesses in competency determinations, 28 Illinois juvenile courts presume that children involved in
abuse cases are competent.29 Even with this rebuttable presumption,
the juvenile court must, nevertheless, find the child competent by
using the same criteria used for adults in criminal court.3 ° The
rebuttable presumption simply gives the benefit of any doubt to the
competency of the child.3
Before a child may testify in court, the court must first find that the
child was capable of observing the events of the particular matter in
question and can now recall and truthfully relate those events to the
court.3 2 The court will examine the child's intelligence and the child's
ability to receive correct impressions as controlling factors for competency.33 For purposes of determining competency, the court will not
because the law did not provide for the opportunity to cross-examine the witness during
videotaping.
24. See People v. Brown, 285 N.E.2d 1, 7 (111. 1992).
25. People v. Jones, 528 N.E.2d 648, 656 (Ill. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040
(1989); People v. Ballinger, 225 N.E.2d 10, 11-12 (111.), cert. denied, 38 U.S. 920
(1967).
26. Ballinger, 225 N.E.2d at 11-12; People v. Karpovich, 123 N.E. 324, 325 (Il.
1919) (requiring determination as to eight-year-old's ability to appreciate the moral duty
to tell the truth); People v. Luigs, 421 N.E.2d 961, 966 (I11.App. 5th Dist. 1981).

27. See Jones, 528 N.E.2d at 648; see also CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK ON
§ 601 (6th ed. 1994) (discussing the determination of competency of

ILLINoIs EVIDENCE

witnesses generally).
28. See Jones, 528 N.E.2d at 656; Karpovich, 123 N.E. at 325.
29. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705, § 405/2-18(4)(d) (West Supp. 1995); see also In
re M.B., 609 N.E.2d 731, 739 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1992) (ruling that the fourteen-yearold witness was competent by virtue of his age). But see Karpovich, 123 N.E. at 325
(finding that presumptions in criminal court only apply to witnesses over the age of
fourteen).
30. Brown, 285 N.E.2d at 8 (finding a twelve-year-old to be competent based on
intelligence, not on age); Ballinger, 225 N.E.2d at 11-12 (finding a nine-year-old boy
competent based on intelligence, not on age).

3 1.

CLEARY

& GRAHAM, supra note 27, § 601.

32. People v. Dempsey, 610 N.E.2d 208, 218 (111.App. 5th Dist. 1993); In re M.B.,
609 N.E.2d at 739.
33. In attempting to establish the competency of a child witness, courts will weigh
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use age as the sole determinant of competency, but will use it as one
factor in such a determination.34 Once the court finds a child
competent to testify, any confusion during the child's subsequent testimony reflects solely on the child's credibility and not on the child's
competency."
Judges must understand that, especially with young children, the
circumstances surrounding the competency hearing do not always
allow the child to properly adapt to the legal environment.36 For
example, is it proper for a judge to find a four-year-old child incompetent to testify in a criminal trial when that child identifies an item on
the judge's desk as a cow when it was actually a bull? Is it proper for
a judge to find a three-year-old child incompetent, when the child
how the child responds against the facts in a given case. This balancing often takes
place after questioning the child about colors, numbers, locations, the identity of
relatives, the school which the child attends, the days of the week, and the difference
between the truth and a lie. See, e.g., People v. Mack, 576 N.E.2d 1023, 1024 (I11.App.
1st Dist. 1991) (noting that the trial judge found the child "plainly competent" after the
child correctly identified the color of a book). Each trial court, however, has different
standards. Some courts may find a child competent simply if the child can correctly
identify the color of the trial judge's robe, while other courts require additional
information. See also supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text for examples of what
various Illinois trial courts have required to establish the competency of child witnesses.
34. See In re M.B., 609 N.E.2d at 739; supra note 30 and accompanying text. The
issue of age as a distinguishing factor between children and adults arises in many court
settings. It is interesting to note that state legislatures differ on the minimum age
necessary to transfer a juvenile defendant to adult courts. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-34
(1986) (setting the minimum age at fourteen); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-318 (Michie
1991) (setting the minimum age at fourteen for capital murder offenses); LA. CHILDREN'S
CODE ANN. art. 305 (West 1984), amended by Act of July 6, 1994, 1994 La. Sess. Law
Serv. 15 (West) (setting the minimum age at fifteen with a finding of probable cause as
to first or second degree murder); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(1) (Supp. 1994) (setting
the minimum age at thirteen); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104.2(A) (West Supp. 1995)
(setting the minimum age at sixteen on a murder charge); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1
(Michie Supp. 1994) (setting the minimum age at fourteen).
The drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence recognized the issue of age inherent in
proposed child shield statutes, and stated:
[Tihe balance between protecting the minor from the trauma of live testimony
in open court on the one hand, and affording the defendant the protections of
the law's preference for live testimony on the other, begins to tilt in favor of
the defendant as the minor reaches an age at which he or she can more
adequately cope with the pressures of trial.
UNIF. R. EVID. 807, cmt. to 1986 amendment, 13B U.L.A. 604 (1994).
35. In re A.M.C., 500 N.E.2d 104, 107 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1986) (holding that
inconsistencies in the five-year-old victim's testimony go only to her credibility as a
witness and-not to the competency issue).
36. Dempsey, 610 N.E.2d at 218 (noting the difficult circumstances under which
children must testify, especially when confronting family members); see also In re N.S.,
627 N.E.2d 1178, 1184-85 (I11.App. 4th Dist.) (discussing a trial court's finding that
the child witness was credible), appeal denied, 627 N.E.2d 1178 (Il1. 1994).
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waited patiently for three hours in the waiting room, but sucked her
thumb periodically during the competency examination because it was
hours past her nap? Finally, how about a four-year-old girl, who
answered "Yes" when asked if she had a sister, but answered "No"
when asked if her sister had a sister?
Children most often become confused in cases when they are
testifying as victims of a crime, 37 and unfortunately, this confusion
often hides emotional trauma. The psychological impact on a child
from testifying against a defendant can be devastating,38 and may be
debilitating when the defendant is a parent or a family member.39
Moreover, this devastating effect may occur in all cases in which a
child testifies, but may be more pronounced in cases of abuse, battery,
kidnapping, and domestic relation disputes. 4° Safeguards are needed,
therefore, to protect children who are testifying.
It is well established that the Illinois Constitution protects minors, as
well as adults. 41 The extent of that protection for minors in the justice
37. The child who witnesses crime or violence in the home, however, may also be
emotionally affected. See generally Alan J. Tomkins et al., The Plight of Children Who
Witness Woman Battering: Psychological Knowledge and Policy Implications, 18 LAW
& PSYCHOL. REV. 137 (1994) (discussing the psychological consequences for a child
who witnesses battering in the home).
38. Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Psychological Association in Support of
Neither Party at 7, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89-478) [hereinafter
APA Brief].
39. If the accused is someone that the child trusted, the child may feel an
overwhelming sense of betrayal if forced to testify against that person. APA Brief,
supra note 38, at 15-16; see also L. Christine Brannon, Comment, The Trauma of
Testifying in Court for Child Victims of Sexual Assault v. The Accused's Right to
Confrontation, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 439, 440-42 (1994) (describing the emotional
impact on child-victim witnesses of testifying against the accused).
While some studies have been conducted on the effects of the justice system on
sexually abused children, see, e.g., Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Note, Videotaping
Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809 (1987), more studies
have been done on preparing a child for surgery than preparing a child to testify, see
John F. Tedesco & Steven V. Schnell, Children's Reactions to Sex Abuse Investigation
and Litigation, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 267, 271 (1987).
40. For a discussion of the effect of fear on children's testimony, see Gail S.
Goodman, Understanding and Improving Children's Testimony, 22 CHILDREN TODAY 13
(1993); Tedesco & Schnell, supra note 39. For a brief discussion of the potential
beneficial effects on sexually abused children from testifying in court, see Brannon,
supra note 39, at 440-42.
41. See People ex rel. Goelzer v. Crawford, 141 N.E. 725, 727 (I11. 1923) (holding
that the Illinois Constitution requires that school districts be sufficiently compact to
allow "the children to reach the school with a reasonable degree of convenience");
People ex rel. Leighty v. Young, 139 N.E. 894, 895 (11. 1923) (discussing the Illinois
Constitution's requirement that all children have access to free public schools). See
generally Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. I
(discussing various constitutional and statutory protections available to children).
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system, however, has recently made the headlines of the Chicago
news. 42 As a result, Illinois legislators have scrambled to enact protective laws.43 With the advent of hastily drafted child protection laws,

42. See, e.g., Mary Dixon, Don't End Accused's Right to Face Accuser, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at 38; David Heckelman, Deadline Looms for Video Testimony

Measure, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 28, 1994, at 1;David Heckelman, Edgar Signs Bill
to Allow Closed Circuit TV Testimony of Abused Children, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept.
10, 1991, at 3; A Shield for Children is Pierced,CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1994, § 1, at 16
(Editorial); Michelle Stevens, Child Witness Law Imperils Rights, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov.
14, 1994, at 31.
For a look at national headlines, see, e.g., Clare Dyer, The Child-Video Horror Story,
GUARDIAN, Feb. 15, 1994, at 19; Sandra Evans & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Young Victims
of Sex Abuse Go Unheard: Civil Suits Become Increasingly Common, WASH. POST, Mar.
15, 1992, at B1; Michael Granberry, Case Illustrates Flaws in Child Abuse Trials, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, at A3; Allan Levy, Witness to Cruelty, GUARDIAN, Apr. 26, 1994,
at 17.
See generally John E.B. Myers, The Child Sexual Abuse Literature: A Call for Greater
Objectivity, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1723-32 (1990) (discussing certain commentators'
unfair criticism and mischaracterization of the judiciary's handling of child sexual abuse
cases).
43. Recent legislation declares that the law furthers "the best interests of the child"
and was passed in response to the decision in In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (I11.), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 499 (1994) (better known as the "Baby Richard case"). See Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act, Pub. Act No. 88-550, 1994 I11.
Legis. Serv. 381 (West),
adding The Children and Family Services Act, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, § 505/7.2
(West 1994), as well as amending portions of the Adoption Act, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 750, §§ 50/8, 50/11, 50/20, and 50/20(a), among others.
Although the Baby Richard case involved an adoption dispute, the case forced child
welfare issues into the spotlight and, thus, affected every area of child welfare law.
Recognizing the importance of children and the law, the appellate court in the Baby
Richard case stated:
[T]he time has long past [sic] when children in our society were considered the
property of their parents. Slowly, but finally, when it comes to children even
the law has rid itself of the Dred Scott mentality that a human being can be
considered a piece of property "belonging" to another human being. To hold
that a child is the property of his parents is to deny the humanity of the child.
...In an adoption, custody or abuse case, however, the child is the real
party ininterest.
In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 651-52 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181
(I11.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) (emphasis added). The appellate court further
noted that "[clourts are here to protect children-not victimize them." Id. at 654. For a
detailed discussion of the Baby Richard case and the amendments to the Illinois
Adoption Act passed by the General Assembly in response to the case, see Susan
Swingle, Comment, Rights of Unwed Fathersand the Best Interests of the Child: Can
These Competing Interests be Harmonized? Illinois' Putative FatherRegistry Provides
an Answer, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 703 (1995). See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) (discussing what the law should require
before the State decides a child's best interests); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) (discussing the law of child placement); Clark, supra
note 41, at 24.

1995]

The Criminal Courtroom

689

courts have recently been challenged to decide the constitutionality of
these statutes.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO CHILD
PROTECTION LEGISLATION
The traditional right of confrontation dates back to at least Roman
times." After the fall'of the Roman Empire, however, the conceptual
right to confrontation disappeared until the jury system was established
in sixteenth-century England.4 5 The right to confront an accuser
played a role in the United States' common law, but the right did not
extend to face-to-face confrontation. 46 Instead, the right to confrontation was virtually indistinguishable from the right to cross-examination
of a witness.4 7
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution grants
accused persons the right to confront their accusers and to crossexamine any witnesses against them." Although the law prefers faceto-face confrontation, the United States Supreme Court posited that the
primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is to
guarantee the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. 4 9 The Supreme
Court recognizes that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not
absolute, 50 and has, for instance, allowed hearsay statements made by
44. For example, the Roman Emperor Trojan told the Governor of Bithynia that
."'anonymous accusations must not be admitted in evidence as against anyone, as it is
introducing a dangerous precedent, and out of accord with the spirit of our times ....
Daniel J.Politt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modem Dress, 8 J.Pub. L.
381, 384 (1959) (quoting JOHN L. O'BRIEN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
62 (1955) (quoting the Emperor)); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16
(1988) (tracing the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation back to Roman and English
law).
45. 1 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 334 (7th ed. rev. 1956);
see also Sir James F. Stephen, Criminal Procedurefrom the Thirteenth to the Eighteenth
Century, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 485-528 (1908)
(discussing the evolution of the jury system in England from 1554 to 1760).
46. See JOHN H. WIGMORE, 5 EVIDENCE § 1397, at 158 (J.Chadbourn rev. 1974),
where Dean Wigmore stated:
There was never at common law any recognized right to an indispensable
thing called confrontation as distinguished from cross-examination. There
was a right to cross-examination as indispensable, and that right was involved
in and secured by confrontation; it was the same right under different names.
Id. For an analysis of this statement, see Coy, 487 U.S. at 1018 n.2.
47. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1018 n.2 (citing WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 1397, at 158).
48. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
49. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (deciding the scope of the
Confrontation Clause).
50. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (holding that accused need
not be present when court issues order correcting the trial record).
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unavailable declarants admitted into evidence. 1
Recently, child shield statutes designed to protect child-victims from
the trauma of testifying in court while facing the accused have been
challenged in court. In the 1988 case of Coy v. Iowa,52 the United
States Supreme Court found unconstitutional a statute" which provided for a screen to shield a child-victim from her alleged abuser.54
Troubled by the absence of a trial court hearing to determine the
necessity of such a screen,55 the Court held that the use of this screen
violated the defendant's right to encounter the accuser face-to-face
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 56 Nevertheless, the Court again refused to declare the right to face-to-face
confrontation absolute.57
Two years later, in Maryland v. Craig,58 the Court again faced the
issue of the constitutionality of a child shield statute. This time,
however, the Court expressly created an exception to face-to-face
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 59 In Craig, a six-year-old
5 1. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 77.
52. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
53. The Iowa statute provided in pertinent part: "'The court may require a party be
confined [sic] to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits the party to
see and hear the child during the child's testimony, but does not allow the child to see or
hear the party."' Id. at 1014 n.l (alteration in original) (quoting IOWA CODE § 910A.14
(1987) (amended 1993)).
54. Id. at 1014-15. In Coy, the defendant sexually assaulted two teenage girls, who
were camping in a tent. Id. During the attack, the defendant shined a flashlight in the
girls' eyes and wore a stocking over his head. Id. At trial, the court allowed the
prosecution to use a screen which, when lighted properly, would allow the defendant to
dimly view the witness, but the witness would be unable to view the defendant. Id. The
defendant objected. Id. The defendant was subsequently found guilty. Id. at 1015.
55. Id. at 1021.
56. Id. at 1015-22. While Coy originated in state court, the Sixth Amendment was
implicated because of the Supreme Court's decision in Pointer v. Texas, which held that
the accused's right to confront the witnesses against him was a fundamental right, and
therefore applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 380 U.S. 400, 406
(1965).
57. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021. The Court stated: "We leave for another day, however,
the question whether any exceptions exist." Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor furthered her support for child-witness protection, stating: "I wish to make
clear that nothing in today's decision necessarily dooms such efforts by state
legislatures to protect child witnesses." Id. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In fact, the Court implied that an exception to face-to-face confrontation would be
created only if: (1) state legislation provided for an individualized determination that
the child would be harmed if required to testify in the defendant's presence; (2) the
legislation furthered an important public policy; and (3) the State did not abrogate the
defendant's right to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 1023-25 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
58. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
59. Id. at 860.
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child-victim testified via a one-way closed-circuit television camera.6'
This method of testimony was authorized by a Maryland statute, which
permitted shielded testimony in cases where courtroom testimony
would result in "serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
reasonably communicate.'
Reiterating the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, the Court
stressed that it was designed to ensure the reliability of evidence
against a criminal defendant by subjecting the evidence to rigorous
60. Id. at 840-43. The prosecutor charged the defendant with child abuse, first and
second degree sexual offenses, perverted sexual practices, and assault and battery, which
took place during the operation of a kindergarten and pre-kindergarten center owned by
the defendant. Id. at 840. The State sought to use the methods prescribed in the state's
child-victim protection statute. Id.
61. Id. at 842 (quoting MD.CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(l)(ii) (1989)
(amended 1992)). The Maryland statute provided:
(a)(l) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law
Article or Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony
of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom
by means of a closed circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the
judge may question the child.
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort
to be unobtrusive.
(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when
the child testifies by closed circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the
opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of the child, including
a person who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning
the abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge
and the defendant shall be in the courtroom.
(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the
persons in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate
electronic method.
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an
attorney pro se.
(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of
identification of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the defendant
in the courtroom at the same time.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (1989) (amended 1992). For a detailed
description of the § 9-102 procedure, see Wildermuth v. State, '530 A.2d 275, 278-79
(Md. 1987), which was overruled by the 1992 amendment.
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testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of
fact.62 The Court found that the statute conformed with the majority of
the component parts of the Confrontation Clause, which include: (1)
face-to-face confrontation; (2) testimony under oath; (3) cross-examination; and (4) observation of the witness' demeanor while testifying.63
While face-to-face confrontation is preferred, the Court recognized that
it may be denied where it is "'necessary to further an important public
policy."'64 The Court recognized that states have a compelling interest
in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from further embarrassment
and trauma. 65 Accordingly, the Court found that the physical and psychological well-being of a child-abuse victim was important enough to
create an exception to a defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation.66
Congress capitalized on the opportunity afforded by the CraigCourt
by enacting the Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights (the
"CVCWR") statute. 67 The CVCWR statute provides for testimony of
a child witness to be taken via two-way closed-circuit television or
videotaped depositions.68 In addition to providing that a child is to be
presumed competent,69 the CVCWR statute protects the child's
privacy, keeps all information concerning the child confidential, and
allows judges to close their courtrooms at their discretion. 70
By setting certain guidelines for the future, the Court's decision in
Craig also opened the door for states to enact child shield laws to
62. Craig, 497 U.S. at 846. For other comments by the Court on the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause, see, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64-65; Dowdell, 221 U.S. at 330;
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43.
63. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46. The Court's opinion rests on the reliability of the
statute in protecting the defendant's rights under the component parts of the
Confrontation Clause, while recognizing that both the defendant's rights and the
protection of the child comprise important public policy issues.
64. Id. at 845 (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021).
65. Id. at 856-57; see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
66. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853.
67. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509 (Supp. 1995).
68. Id. § 3509(b).
69. Id. § 3509(c)(2). For the differences on this presumption among lower courts, see
supra part III.
70. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(d), (e). For constitutional challenges to the CVCWR statute,
see United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the intent of
Congress in enacting the CVCWR statute is consistent with the constitutional standard
approved by the Craig Court, regardless of minor distinctions in the language); United
States v. Carrier, 9 F.3d 867, 870 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting the differences between the
CVCWR statute and the Craig requirements), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1571 (1994);
United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the trial
court satisfied the procedural requirements of the statute and the constitutional
requirements of Craig).
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protect minor witnesses. Post-Craigstatutes must provide that the
State show the following: (1) that the use of one-way closed-circuit
television is required to protect the welfare of the child witness; 7' (2)
that the defendant, and not the courtroom, would be the cause of any
trauma to the 72child; and (3) that the State is furthering an important
public policy.
Approximately one year after the Court's decision in Craig, the
Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois Child Shield Act of
1991.73 This law protected child-victim witnesses in sexual abuse
cases by providing for the use of closed-circuit television and for contemporaneous cross-examination outside of the defendant's presence;
thus appearing almost identical to the law upheld in Craig.74 In 1994,

7 1. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856. This guideline was developed in 1987 by the Maryland
Supreme Court, when it suggested that "testimony about the likely impact on the child
testifying must be definite, related to the statutory standard, and specific to the potential
child witness him or herself." Wildermuth, 530 A.2d at 289. See generally Kimberly
Seals Bressler, Balancing the Right to Confrontation and the Need to Protect Child
Sexual Abuse Victims: Are Statutes Authorizing Televised Testimony Serving Their
Purpose?. 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 109, 114-20 (1988) (discussing Wildermuth and
the relationship between televised testimony and hearsay).
72. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56. It should be noted that the Court solely focused on the
emotional trauma and not the inability of the child to reasonably communicate at trial.
Id. By not including this as a prerequisite necessary for the procedure, the Court gave
trial courts the flexibility necessary to protect child-victims under a lesser showing of
facts. Id. at 856.
The drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence also focused only on the emotional
trauma of the child, by requiring that the court make a preliminary finding of a
substantial likelihood that the child would suffer severe harm if required to testify in
open court. UNIF. R. EvID. 807(d), 13B U.L.A. 602-03 (1994). In an explanation of this
requirement, the drafters stated:
This standard is intended to require more than a showing of mere distress on
the part of a child who is faced with the prospect of testifying. . . . The court
is in an adequate position to assess the surrounding circumstances and to form
a judgment concerning the likely effect of live testimony in open court on the
minor without expert assistance....
. . . [T]he court should consider such factors as the age of the minor, the
minor's physical and mental condition, the relationship between the minor
and the parties, the nature of the acts about which the minor is to testify, [and]
the nature of the proceeding ....
UNIF. R. EvlD. 807, cmt. to 1986 amendment, 13B U.L.A. 603-04 (1994) (citations
omitted).
73.' ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/106B-1 (West 1992) (repealed 1994)
(replaced by ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/106B-5 (West Supp. 1995)).
74. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
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however, the Illinois Supreme Court held in People v. Fitzpatrick"
that the Child Shield Act violated the Illinois Constitution.
In Fitzpatrick,prosecutors charged the defendant with seven counts
of aggravated criminal sexual assault against his four minor grandchildren. 76 The State moved to have the children testify via closedcircuit television, pursuant to the Child Shield Act. 77 The defense
challenged the constitutionality of the statute, which permitted testimony by closed-circuit television, because the Act would not allow the
defendant to meet the witnesses face-to-face.78 The trial court barred
the use ofthe closed-circuit television, 79 and the Illinois Supreme
75. 633 N.E.2d 685, 688-89 (I11.
1994). For a thorough discussion of the facts of
People v. Fitzpatrick and the Illinois General Assembly's response, see Thomas
Conklin, Note, People v. Fitzpatrick: The Path to Amending the Illinois Constitution
to Protect Child Witnesses in Criminal Sexual Abuse Cases, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 321
(1995).
76. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 686.
77. Id. The State argued that the children "would suffer serious emotional or other
severe adverse effects, or might be unable to reasonably communicate, absent an order
allowing their testimony to be presented solely by closed-circuit television." Id.
Alternatively, the State could have moved for the court to allow the admission of the
children's hearsay statements without requiring the children to testify. A child may be
considered unavailable under Illinois rules of evidence, when the child would suffer
sufficient trauma to render him unable to speak or communicate. People v. Rocha, 547
N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1989) (discussing the application of ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10 (1987) (current version at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725,
§ 5/115-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994))).
Just 15 years ago, only four states admitted child hearsay testimony outside of the
spontaneous declaration exception in Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Robert G. Marks, Note, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The
Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 207, 212 n.21 (1995); see FED. R. EvID. 803(2) (allowing statements "relating to
a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition."); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1994)
(creating an exception for children of tender years); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (creating an exception for children under ten years of age);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 908.03(24), 908.045(6) (West 1993) (using residual hearsay
exceptions); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163 (West 1986) (creating exception for
children under ten years of age who are describing a sexual act). See generally Marks,
supra (analyzing the state rules which admit hearsay in child sexual abuse cases).
In 1986, the drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence adopted a hearsay exception
designed to allow the admittance of statements by minors under age twelve who were
physically or sexually assaulted, if the State shows that: "(i) there is a substantial
likelihood that the minor will suffer severe emotional or psychological harm if required
to testify in open court; [and] (ii) the time, content, and circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness .... ." UNIF. R. EvID.
807(a), 13B U.L.A. 602 (1994). As of the date of the 1986 amendment, more than
twenty states had adopted special hearsay exceptions similar to the Model rule. Id. R.
807 cmt. to 1986 amendment, 13B'U.L.A. at 603.
78. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 686.
79. Id.
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Court upheld the trial court's finding that the Child Shield Act violated
the defendant's constitutional right to meet the witnesses face-toface. 80 Essentially, the Fitzpatrick court held that the Illinois Constitution8 1 provided defendants with greater rights than the Federal
Confrontation Clause,82 and thus the defendant had the express and
unqualified right to face-to-face confrontation. 3
Enraged legislators quickly drafted an amendment to negate the
effects of Fitzpatrick,4 and to bring the Illinois Constitution in line
with
the Federal
The amendment
sparked
debates
over
whether
the needConstitution."
to protect child-victim
witnesses
was so
great as
to
80. Id. at 688-89. In reaching this conclusion, the Fitzpatrick court found the result
reached by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig to be inapplicable,
because the Illinois Constitution expressly mandated face-to-face confrontation while
the Federal Constitution made no such guarantees. Id.
The face-to-face language had been part of the Bill of Rights section of the Illinois
Constitution since its adoption in 1818. See ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 9,
reprinted in STATUTES OF ILLINOIS 27 (Eugene L. Gross ed., 3d ed. 1871). Although the

exact words contained in the Illinois and Federal Confrontation Clauses are different, the
delegates at the Constitutional Convention of 1970 discussed the differences and at least
expressed the belief that the two clauses were meant to protect the same interests. 3
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1373 (1972)
[hereinafter 3 RECORD].

81. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 8 (amended 1994). The Constitution provided in
pertinent part:
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and
have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face ....
Id. (emphasis added).
82. The United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).

83. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687-88. A few states have held that their state
constitutions provide no greater protection than the Federal Constitution. See, e.g.,
Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318-22 (Ala. 1979) (discussing the federal and state
constitutional rights against self-incrimination); McCrory v. State, 342 So. 2d 897,
900-01 (Miss. 1977) (interpreting the federal and state rights against selfincrimination). The majority of states posit that their state constitutions can provide
greater protection of civil liberties than the United States Constitution. See, e.g.,
Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 577-79 (Iowa 1980) (discussing the federal and
state equal protection clauses); People v. Hoshowski, 310 N.W.2d 228, 229-30 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1981) (extending Miranda rights); State v. Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (Or.
1977) (en banc) (holding that Oregon may adopt stricter constitutional protections than
the Federal Constitution provides). For a list of states with the majority view, see
People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 164 (II1. 1984) (Clark, J., concurring).
84. GEORGE H. RYAN, SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONsTrrUrTIoN OF ILLINOIS (1994).

85. In fact, the delegates to the 1970 Convention proposed an amendment to bring
the Illinois Confrontation Clause in line with the Federal Confrontation Clause, but
voted to retain the original wording simply because they "liked" it. 3 RECORD, supra
note 80, at 1373.
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warrant a change in the state constitution.16 On November 8, 1994,
popular opinion prevailed as Illinois voters ratified the constitutional
amendment.87 The amendment changed the "face to face" language in
the Illinois Constitution to the "right to be confronted" by a witness
language of the United States Constitution.88 One month later, the
Illinois General Assembly amended the portion of the code of criminal
procedure which provides protection for child witnesses,8 9 by adding a
86. See supra note 42.
87. For a criticism of these types of statutes, see Jacqueline M. Beckett, The True
Value of the Confrontation Clause, A Study of Child Sex Abuse Trials, 82 GEO. L.J. 1605
(1994). See also Craig, 497 U.S. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that studies
indicate that "children are substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults, and
often unable to separate recollected fantasy (or suggestion) from reality.").
88. See Michelle Stevens, Child Witness Law Imperils Rights, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov.
14, 1994, at 31.
89. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/106B-5 (West Supp. 1995). In 1994, the
General Assembly repealed the earlier version of the statute, § 5/106B-1, and replaced it
with § 5/106B-5. Act of Dec. 14, 1994, Pub. Act No. 88-674, 1994 111.Legis. Serv.
2664 (West). Section 5/106B-5 provides:
(a) In a proceeding in the prosecution of an offense of criminal sexual
assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or
aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a court may order that the testimony of a
child victim under the age of 18 years be taken outside the courtroom and
shown in the courtroom by means of a closed circuit television if:
(1) the testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(2) the judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate or that the child will suffer
severe emotional distress that is likely to cause the child to suffer severe
adverse effects.
(b) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the
judge may question the child.
(c) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort to
be unobtrusive.
(d) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when the
child testifies by closed circuit television:
(1) the prosecuting attorney;
(2) the attorney for the defendant;
(3) the judge;
(4) the operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(5) any person or persons whose presence, in the opinion of the court,
contributes to the well-being of the child, including a person who has dealt
with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning the abuse, a parent or
guardian of the child, and court security personnel.
(e) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the defendant
shall be in the courtroom and shall not communicate with the jury if the cause
is being heard before a jury.
(f) The defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the persons in the
room where the child is testifying by any appropriate electronic method.
(g) The provisions of this Section do not apply if the defendant represents
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paragraph to make the statute applicable to all prosecutions pending or
commenced after the effective date of the amendment. 90 The protection
for child-victims who are required to testify was thus reinstated.
V. EFFECTS OF THE NEW LAW

Although intended to protect child witnesses, the new Illinois law is
narrowly drafted and its effectiveness is diminished in many ways.
Most importantly, the law limits protection to child-victims in sexual
assault or abuse cases. 9' Although the statute is designed to protect
sexually assaulted or abused children from the devastating effects of
facing the accused while testifying, a number of other offenses, such
as aggravated battery, kidnapping, cruelty to children, and domestic
battery, can be just as damaging to a testifying child.92 Thus, if a
father is being prosecuted for domestic battery of the child's mother
and the child is called to testify, the child does not receive any
consideration under the statute, even though the child witness in the
domestic battery case may be just as emotionally traumatized as a
child-victim in a sexual assault or abuse case.
Additionally, the new law limits the method of protection for the
child witness to the use of a closed-circuit television and restricts the
manner of use of the television. 93 Some states permit one-way screens
as an alternative to closed-circuit television, 9' while others use twohimself pro se.
(h) This Section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of
identification of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the defendant
in the courtroom at the same time.
(i) This Section applies to prosecutions pending on or commenced on or
after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1994.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/106B-5.
90. Id. § 5/106B-5(i).
9 1. See id. § 5/106B-5(a).
92. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. By way of contrast, Indiana is one
state which allows the use of closed-circuit testimony in cases extending beyond sex
crimes to include battery upon a child, kidnapping and confinement, incest, and neglect
of a dependant. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994). For a
discussion of Indiana's child shield statute, see John P. Serketich, A Conflict of
Interests: The Constitutionality of Closed-Circuit Television in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 217 (1992). The Uniform Rules of Evidence extend even
further to allow closed-circuit testimony of not only minor victims but also minor
witnesses of sexual conduct or physical violence. UNIF. R. EVID. 807(d), 13B U.L.A.
602-03 (1994).
93. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/106B-5(a)-(e).
94. In her concurring opinion in Coy v. Iowa, Justice O'Connor suggested that a
screen might have been appropriate had the trial court held a hearing to determine the
necessity of the procedure to protect the welfare of the child. 487 U.S. 1012, 1022-25
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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way closed-circuit television and video taped depositions. 95 Alternatively, some defense attorneys suggest that the court remove the
defendant to a separate room instead of the child, thus allowing the
jury to observe the child testifying. This suggestion should be
seriously considered, because a child testifying in chambers in front of
a closed-circuit television may not exhibit certain body language that
the jury would otherwise observe. The lack of body language may
add to the credibility of the child's testimony, because the child appears relaxed. On the other hand, the child may exhibit a false sense
of confidence, which the jury could misinterpret as a lack of
credibility. The presence of the child in front of the jury, outside the
presence of the defendant, probably provides the most realistic conditions for the fact-finding process.
Next, the new law requires that the child face the accused in court
for purposes of identification.96 Many child advocates and victims'
groups posit that the most devastating effect on the child often occurs
when the child simply sees the accused in person for the first time in
court. In many cases, however, the most devastating effect occurs
when the child must point the final finger to identify the defendant,
who is often a parent or caretaker. 97 The identification process thus
adds to the feeling of helplessness that a child experiences in court.
95. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-3, (Supp. 1994) (closed-circuit equipment);

ALASKA STAT.

§ 12.45.046 (Supp. 1994) (allowing the use of one-way mirrors or closed-circuit
television); AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1989) (allowing use of one-way mirror,
screen or videotape); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West 1994) (screen or closedcircuit television); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1995) (closed-circuit
television); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (1990 & Supp. 1994) (closed-circuit television);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (closed-circuit television or
videotape); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West 1994 & Supp. 1994) (closed-circuit
television or videotape); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1993) (closed-circuit television
or recording); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Baldwin 1992) (closed-circuit television
or recording); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West 1992) (closed-circuit television);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (closed-circuit
television); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (Law Co-op 1992) (film, videotape, or
simultaneous transmission); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995)
(closed-circuit television or videotape); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1994)
(closed-circuit television); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West 1994) (closed-circuit
television); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1148 (West 1987) (closed-circuit television or
recording); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(24) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (closed-circuit
television); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5984, 5985 (Supp. 1994) (videotaped deposition and
closed-circuit television); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (1994) (videotape or closedcircuit television); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 3 (West Supp. 1995)
(closed-circuit television); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5 (closed-circuit television); VT. R.
EVID. 807(d), (e) (closed-circuit television or recording).
96. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/106B-5(h).
97. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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While testifying, the child will frequently focus on the attorney, a
friendly face, or an object in the courtroom. This focus allows the
child to relate his or her entire testimony, albeit nervously. As soon as
the need arises for the testifying child to focus on and to identify the
defendant, however, the child transforms into complete helplessness.
The child may revert to infantile behavior, such as thumb-sucking or
sitting in the fetal position, and will display an intense vulnerability.
While the identification of the accused is a necessary part of the State's
case, some other method of identification must be developed to
adequately safeguard the child's emotional well-being. Otherwise, it
appears that a court may have to emotionally devastate a child to obtain
the child's testimony. Accordingly, courts and legislators must carefully scrutinize the alternative identification issue in the future.
Moreover, if a defendant decides to proceed pro se, the new law
renders the entire closed-circuit television procedure inapplicable.98
Thus, a defendant may attempt to become pro se in order to influence
the manner in which the child will testify. This provision begs an
equal protection" challenge. For example, a defendant who exercises
the right to an attorney under the Sixth Amendment is not allowed to
confront a child witness face-to-face, yet a pro se litigant will be
allowed to confront a child witness face-to-face.
Finally, a case involving criminal sexual assault or abuse will likely
be heard in both a juvenile and a criminal court. The two courts differ,
however, on the standard used to determine the competency of a child
witness. In juvenile court, the child is presumed competent to testify,
although this presumption is rebuttable.' 00 A criminal court will,
however, make a de novo determination as to whether the child is
competent, which is the same as a competency determination for an
adult witness.' 0 ' As a consequence, a child in juvenile court may
testify regarding sexual abuse and thus show the need for intervention,
while a criminal court may prevent that same child from testifying and
thus allow the defendant to go free. With the shift in Illinois law
towards an emphasis on the best interests of the child, such discrepancies should not prevent the child from testifying in criminal
court. While the burdens of proof are different, perhaps the transcript
98. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/106B-5(g). This section provides: "The
provisions of this Section do not apply if the defendant represents himself pro se." Id.
99. The United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
100. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705, § 405/2-18(4)(d).
101. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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of the proceeding in juvenile court should be used in the criminal case.
This alternative method of testimony would protect the child-victim
from facing the accused, while preserving the right to cross-examine
the witness in the juvenile proceeding. While many other factors come
into play, Illinois courts and legislators need to further examine these
issues.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the number of child witnesses increase in direct correlation to the
rising number of child abuse reports, emphasis must be placed on the
unified treatment of all minor witnesses.'0 2 A definite need exists for a
unified code of Illinois juvenile and child welfare laws that pertain to
children as victims or as witnesses. As we approach the centennial of
the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 0 3 all the laws affecting children need
and deserve a close and thorough examination by the Illinois General
Assembly. In the process, lawmakers must work to maintain the
delicate balance between protecting the child and protecting the substantive and procedural due process rights of the defendant.
Courts, too, must take an active role in matters concerning child
witnesses. Trial judges must carefully exercise their discretion and
consider a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights when deciding the
competency of child witnesses and when permitting testimony via
closed-circuit television. All parties are entitled to due process, but it
is the judge's role to protect and to promote the welfare of children in
the courtroom. Accordingly, whether it means removing their robes
and sitting cross-legged on the floor with the child, or permitting
testimony via closed-circuit television, judges must focus on "parent"
and "defendant" through the eyes of a child. Judges could more
effectively carry out this awesome responsibility if the child welfare
laws comprised one unified and consistent body."°'
102. Recognizing this need in creating Rule 807, the drafters of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence stated: "This rule takes the broad approach of extending the hearsay exception
and alternative means of testifying (1) to minors who are witnesses as well as those who
are victims of sexual conduct or physical violence, and (2) to those who are called to
testify in civil as well as criminal proceedings." UNIF. R. EVID. 807 cmt. to 1986
amendment, 13B U.L.A. 604 (1994).
103. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705, §§ 405/1-1 to 405/7-1 (West 1992 & Supp.
1995).
104. One commentator suggested that all delinquency cases should be tried in
criminal court instead of juvenile court, and abuse and neglect cases should be tried in
family courts along with domestic relation disputes. Jill S. Chanen, Judging the
Juvenile Justice System: Is Our Legal System Guilty of Not Putting Children First?,
BARRISTER, Winter 1995, at 15, 17-18.
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If Illinois is truly concerned with the best interests of the child, the
General Assembly must devise additional protections and safeguards
within the written law. Courts, attorneys, and legislators must understand that they hold the power to make these changes a reality for the
children who need these changes the most.

